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I. INTRODUCTION
When you were a child, you tattled on someone: an older
sibling, your rowdy cousin, your best friend, whomever. You
tattled on someone, and it did not go over well. It strained your
relationships. The other kids talked; they called you a tattletale.
Maybe you were ostracized for a while. No one wanted to let you
in on their plans until they knew for sure where your loyalties lay.
You were a liability.
The kids reacted in ways that were understandable enough, but
adults often responded absolutely inscrutably. At times, offenders
met with swift justice when the authority figure to whom you had
reported intervened. Perhaps you were even thanked for helping to
enforce the rules. Other times though, you were met with a
rebuke. "You shouldn't tattle on your friends," your teacher might
say, or, when your sister was playing with her toys instead of
practicing her penmanship, your mother might respond, annoyed,
"I don't have time for that right now."
Was there really any way to know when you were supposed to
tattle? Wasn't the enforcement of justice completely contingent on
the mood of the authority figure to whom you reported? Maybe
these uncertainties were what led you, eventually, to eschew
tattling altogether. Or maybe you renounced the practice because
the people on whom you most frequently had a chance to tattle
were your friends, and at some point, your loyalty to them and
your fear of their disapprobation began to greatly outweigh any
interest you had in the enforcement of the rules. This much is
certain: a long time before you sat for the bar, you internalized the
lesson that tattling can get you into trouble.
This lesson, perhaps, is the reason why the American Bar
Association has found it necessary to create an affirmative duty to
report another lawyer's misconduct in at least some circumstances.
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Under Model Rule 8.3,1 an attorney is guilty of an ethical violation
if he fails to report another attorney's professional misconduct,
when that misconduct raises a "substantial question" as to the other
attorney's fitness to practice law.2 But old habits die hard. It will
come as no surprise that lawyers prefer not to report the
misconduct of their peers.3 This hesitancy may be expressed in
terms of "minding one's own business." It may be defended as
"deference to a fellow member of the professional community." In
its most self-interested (and probably most accurate) formulation,
the hesitancy stems from a fear of damage to one's personal and
professional reputation and relationships.
Though such personal concerns admittedly address only half of
the issue, the argument I put forth in this Comment is that they are
not wholly inappropriate to a discussion of one attorney's duty to
report another's misconduct. While the legal profession has an
unquestioned interest in enforcing its disciplinary rules, it also has
competing interests in maintaining the professional reputations of
its members and in promoting loyalty and fraternity between
fellow practitioners.4 A rule requiring the reporting of professional
misconduct clearly serves the first interest but interferes
substantially with the latter two. Striking an appropriate balance
among these interests is the purpose of this Comment.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief history of the
development of Model Rule 8.3, with special attention to its
differences from its predecessor rule, Disciplinary Rule 1-103. It
also considers state-by-state variations on Rule 8.3; Louisiana in
particular requires reporting misconduct in a greater number of
cases than most sister states. Part III considers the wisdom of any
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2007).
2. AM. BAR ASS'N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
595 (5th ed. 2003).
3. Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 538.
4. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (2003)
(discussed in greater detail, infra Part III.B); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Professions
Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a Postprofessional World,
33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 713, 717 (1999); see also Colin Croft, Note,
Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for Deliberative
Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1256, 1267-68 (1992).
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rule requiring attorneys to report on one another. It briefly treats
the question of such a rule's enforceability and then turns to the
crux of the investigation: the sociology of the modem bar and its
effect on a lawyer's inclination to report a fellow lawyer's
misconduct. I argue that fear of damage to his working
relationships and reputation often results in a lawyer's
unwillingness to report another lawyer's misconduct. Since
maintaining good relationships between attorneys is a legitimate
and acknowledged interest of the professional bar, I conclude that
a lawyer, by considering the effect of reporting on his professional
reputation before electing to report, is in actuality supporting the
interests of the bar. Thus, I advocate a balancing test (as opposed
to the prevailing per se rule) to determine whether disciplinary
sanctions are appropriate under Rule 8.3. A court should balance
the gravity of the offense that went unreported against the damage
that would have been done to the attorney's reputation and
working relationships in the event that he had reported it. Finally,
Part IV offers a few concluding observations regarding an
attorney's duty to report professional misconduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Model Rule
National standards for the ethical conduct of American lawyers
have been on the scene since early in the twentieth century.5 The
American Bar Association was founded in 1878, and by 1900, it
had emerged as the preeminent bar association in the United
States.6 In 1908, it adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics.7
Canon 29 was the earliest direct forerunner of modem day Rule
8.3. It provided that "[l]awyers should expose without fear or
5. Croft, supra note 4, at 1297; Cynthia L. Gendry, Comment, Ethics-An
Attorney's Duty to Report the Professional Misconduct of Co- Workers, 18 S. ILL.
U. L.J. 603, 604 (1994); David C. Olsson, Reporting Peer Misconduct: Lip Service
to Ethical Standards Is Not Enough, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 657, 659-60 (1989).
6. Croft, supra note 4, at 1292-93; Olsson, supra note 5, at 659.
7. Croft, supra note 4, at 1297; Gendry, supra note 5, at 604; Olsson, supra
note 5, at 659-60.
8. Gendry, supra note 5, at 604; Olsson, supra note 5, at 660-61.
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favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct in
the profession . . . . 9 That Canon 29 used the word "should"
instead of "shall" indicates that the rule was more a normative
statement than a standard to which adherence could be
compelled. 0 In fact, the Canons generally were enacted without
enforcement procedures; as a whole, they were goals for legal
professional behavior, but there seems to have been no notion of
disciplining attorneys who failed to comply with them."I
In 1969, the ABA's adoption of the Code of Professional
Responsibility changed all this.' 2  Under the Code, reporting
professional misconduct became compulsory, and failure to report
was itself made an ethical violation warranting disciplinary
action. 13  Disciplinary Rule 1-103 requires that "[a] lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a[n] . . . authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation."'
14
The ABA found that Disciplinary Rule 1-103 was effectively
unenforceable,'5 and so in 1983, when it replaced the Code with
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it significantly modified
the reporting requirement. Rule 8.3 provides, in pertinent part:
"[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate
professional authority.'' 16
By tying the duty to report to the seriousness of the
offense-via the "substantial question" language-Rule 8.3
purportedly makes the reporting requirement more enforceable.
9. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHIcs Canon 29 (1908).
10. Gendry, supra note 5, at 604.
11. N. Gregory Smith, Missed Opportunities: Louisiana's Version of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, 61 LA. L. REv. 1, 4 (2000). See Olsson, supra note
5, at 661.
12. Olsson, supra note 5, at 661.
13. Id.; Gendry, supra note 5, at 604-05.
14. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103 (1969).
15. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2007); Gendry, supra
note 5, at 605; Olsson, supra note 5, at 662. An in-depth discussion of the
enforceability issue follows infra Part III.A.
16. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDucT R. 8.3 (2007).
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B. State-by-State Variations on Model Rule 8.3
The Model Rules do not have any binding effect based solely
on their adoption by the ABA. Before a state bar association may
enforce the Model Rules, it must adopt them. The bar associations
have sometimes adopted the text of the Model Rules verbatim, but
in many cases, they have made changes. Such deviations may be
merely cosmetic, or may effect substantive changes to the Rule.
The states have adopted versions of Model Rule 8.3 that vary
widely. Some have created a rule that is effectively a weak
suggestion that professional misconduct should be reported.
Others have created an absolute command to report misconduct,
untied (or weakly tied) to the seriousness of the underlying
offense. In the following subsections, I briefly survey the most
extreme variations on Model Rule 8.3.17 In doing so, it is the
author's purpose to demonstrate that although the ABA has been
able to settle on a standard governing a lawyer's duty to report
misconduct, its standard has remained a matter of contention
among those empowered to give effect to the duty. Additionally,
the types of alterations made by the states help to lay a foundation
for the suggestions that I offer for revision of Rule 8.3.18
1. The Georgia Rule
Georgia has adopted a variation on Model Rule 8.3 that
harkens back to Canon 29 of the ABA's Canons of Professional
Ethics. The Georgia Rule provides:
A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, should inform the appropriate professional
17. For a more in-depth survey of the variations on Model Rule 8.3, ranging
from mild to extreme, see Julie L. Hussey, Reporting Another Attorney for
Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct: The Current Status of the Law in the
States Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 J.
LEGAL PROF. 265 (1999).
18. See infra Part III.E.
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authority. . . . There is no disciplinary penalty for a
violation of this Rule.'
9
As in Canon 29, use of the permissive "should" implies that the
Georgia Rule is merely hortatory; it encourages reporting
misbehavior without requiring it. Georgia Rule 8.3 goes a step
further than Canon 29, in fact, by explicitly disclaiming any threat
of disciplinary proceedings for failure to comply.
Jurisprudence on the Georgia Rule might reveal the reason for
these deviations from the Model Rules. Unfortunately, this
author's search for jurisprudence on Georgia's Rule 8.3 was
fruitless. This is hardly surprising, since the Rule creates no
obligation. Clearly where there is no obligation, there can be no
substantial litigation, and such has proved to be the case here. Yet
more disappointing, the comments to the Georgia Rule offer no
insight into the Georgia drafters' intentions in deviating from the
norm set by the ABA; the Georgia drafters merely reproduce the
language of comment one to the Model Rule and omit comments
two through five; they do not add any explanatory notes of their
own.
20
2. The Louisiana Rule
Louisiana's version of Rule 8.3 also differs appreciably from
the Model Rule. When Louisiana adopted the Model Rules in
1986, it altered Rule 8.3 so as to retain much of the force of prior
19. Ga. R. Bar Rule 4-102, RPC Rule 8.3(a) (2007).
20. Model Rules of Professional Responsibility Rule 8.3, comment 1 states:
Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the
profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar
obligation with respect to judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary
investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important
where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.
Such a comment is merely an encouragement to comply with the substantive rule,
and so is equally appropriate to the Model Rule and the Georgia rule. Comments
2 through 5 of the Model Rules deal primarily with exceptions to the reporting
requirement, which, for obvious reasons, need not be detailed in the context of the
Georgia rule. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmts. (2007); Ga. R.
Bar Rule 4-102, RPC Rule 8.3 cmt. 1 (2007).
936 [Vol. 68
Disciplinary Rule 1-103.2 1 At the time of its adoption, Louisiana's
Rule 8.3 provided: "[a] lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge
of a violation of this code shall report such knowledge to a tribunal
or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation."
22
The Rule lacked the qualifying language of the Model Rule,
requiring that a "substantial question" arise before an attorney
could be bound to report. Under the original Louisiana rule, all
professional misconduct had to be reported, just as when
Disciplinary Rule 1-103 was in effect in Louisiana.
Louisiana's Rule 8.3 was amended by the state supreme court
in 200423 and currently provides: "[a] lawyer who knows that
another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a question as to the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.1
24
The important observation here is that the new Rule continues
to omit the ABA's "substantial question" language. To at least
some degree then, Louisiana has apparently ignored the ABA's
contention that a broad-sweeping duty to report is virtually
impossible to enforce.
The question remains, however, whether Louisiana's rule
sweeps as broadly as did Disciplinary Rulel-103. No court to date
has interpreted Louisiana's present version of Rule 8.3, but it was
discussed briefly in In re Riehlmann.25 The Riehlmann case arose
under Louisiana's original version of Rule 8.3, which required
reporting of all professional misconduct. Referring to the adoption
of the current version of Rule 8.3, the Louisiana Supreme Court
wrote, "We made significant changes to Rule 8.3 effective March
1, 2004, long after the formal charges were filed against
respondent." 26 The 2004 amendment implemented the "raises a
question" language of the current Louisiana rule; that the court
21. In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1246 (La. 2005).
22. LA. ST. BAR ARTS. OF INCORP. art. XVI, RPC Rule 8.3 (1986).
23. Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d at 1246 n.5.
24. LA. ST. BAR ARTS. OF INCORP. art. XVI, RPC Rule 8.3(a) (2007)
(emphasis added).
25. 891 So. 2d at 1246 n.5.
26. Id.
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characterized the amendment as "significant" indicates that the
amendment may alter the level of misconduct that will trigger a
duty to report.
Thus, at least under the Riehlmann dicta, not every instance of
misconduct necessarily "raises a question" as to an attorney's
fitness to practice law, and so not every instance of misconduct
triggers a duty to report in Louisiana. Thus, the quantum of
misconduct is higher under the Louisiana Rule than under
Disciplinary Rule 1-103. At the same time however, since we
should give effect to the difference in language between the Model
Rule and the Louisiana rule, the quantum of misconduct must be
less under Louisiana's Rule 8.3 than under Model Rule 8.3.
Accordingly, although the law is unsettled, Louisiana apparently
adheres to an intermediate standard between Disciplinary Rule 1-
103 and Model Rule 8.3. The contours of that standard have yet to
be fleshed out.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Enforceability
The first challenge facing a rule that requires reporting of
another's misconduct is the question of its enforceability. The
ABA recognized that Disciplinary Rule 1-103 was practically
unenforceable as written,27 and in response, it adopted the
"substantial question" language of Model Rule 8.3, anticipating,
presumably, that the new language would render the Rule
enforceable. Arguably, the new language does little, if anything, to
enhance the enforceability of the Rule. 2
We should say that a rule is enforceable to the extent that the
people who violate it may be identified and disciplined. The
question, then, is whether we are better able to identify those who
fail to report misconduct that "raises a substantial question" than
those who fail to report lesser misconduct. Looked at in this way,
it should become clear that the very nature of the offense makes
27. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2007). See also
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-1998, at 327 (1999).
28. Gendry, supra note 5, at 605.
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the rule prohibiting it virtually unenforceable. There are two
elements of the offense: (1) knowledge of an ethical violation of
sufficient magnitude, and (2) failure to report that violation. But
meeting either of these requirements is unlikely to arouse the
suspicion of the bar's disciplinary committee. Knowledge is
particularly difficult to impute from the outside.29 Furthermore, by
failing to report, an attorney merely goes about his business as
usual. There is nothing that would lead an outside party to
investigate an attorney who has violated such a rule. The most
important observation here is that this is true no matter how
egregious the underlying offense is. There is nothing about the
underlying offense that makes an attorney's knowledge of its
occurrence or his failure to report it any more outwardly
suspicious.
Probably, it was in recognition of Rule 8.3's unenforceability
that Georgia enacted its reporting requirement without a
disciplinary penalty for its violation.3 0  Where a rule cannot be
enforced, it becomes, de facto, an exhortation to a certain kind of
conduct; on this view, the Georgia Rule merely wears its hortatory
character on its sleeve instead of masquerading as an enforceable
rule of law.
Some commentators have suggested imposing very harsh
penalties on those few unlucky attorneys who are found to have
violated Rule 8.3.31 By doing so, they argue, we could ensure that
compliance with the Rule is high, since other attorneys would fear
similar punishments. There is, indeed, some empirical support for
this position. 32 However, the chances of being caught violating
29. But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2007) ("A person's
knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."). Nevertheless, it is reasonable
to suppose that in the prototypical Rule 8.3 case, the only person with knowledge
of the relevant circumstances is the one with knowledge of the violation. This was
the case in Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239. The defendant in Riehlmann took the
unprecedented step of (unwittingly) recounting the circumstances supporting the
inference that he had knowledge of a reportable violation. Id. Such cooperation
cannot be expected in a majority of cases.
30. Ga. R. Bar Rule 4-102, RPC Rule 8.3 (2007).
31. Gendry, supra note 5, at 609.
32. Id.; Donald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's
Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 977, 992
(1988). Rotunda observes that following the decision of the Illinois Supreme
2008] 939
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Rule 8.3 are so slim that disciplinary sanctions, in order to be
prohibitive, would likely have to be out of all proportion with the
gravity of the offense. In this light, prohibitive penalties seem
peculiarly unjust as applied to those few who are found to have
violated Rule 8.3.
At the same time, Georgia's no-penalty Rule is also
dissatisfactory in ways. There are instances where a failure to
report another attorney's misconduct clearly rises to a level that
would justify some punishment. 33  When such a case arises, we
want there to be a rule under which courts can impose punishment.
Georgia courts would have their hands tied no matter how
egregious was the attorney's failure to report. Ultimately, it is this
consideration that leads me to admit that the rule generally is
unenforceable. Nevertheless, I must conclude that it is desirable
and should be enforced in those rare instances where it can and
should be. As a corollary to this, it is not apparent why the ABA is
concerned at all about the enforceability of a rule creating a duty to
report misconduct since such a rule is a good one to have around
regardless of its enforceability.
Upon reflection, it appears that the "substantial question"
language of Rule 8.3 actually addresses a concern other than
enforceability. In what follows, I argue that the primary effect of
Court in In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988) (taking the unprecedented
action of disciplining an attorney who had violated Rule 8.3, but had not at the
same time run afoul of any other Rule), lawyers all over the country began to
report professional misconduct in greater numbers.
33. Riehlmann is such a case. In Riehlmann, an attorney confided in
respondent Riehlmann that he had intentionally suppressed exculpatory blood
evidence in a criminal prosecution. The defendant in that case was sentenced to
death. Only about a month before his sentence was to be carried out, defendant's
counsel discovered the results of tests on blood evidence that proved conclusively
that defendant could not have been the perpetrator. Riehlmann, upon learning of
the exoneration proceedings, surmised that this was the case about which his
friend had confided in him five years earlier, and cooperated with the defense to
exonerate the defendant. Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239. Punishment seems to be
proper in such a case, since, apparently, Riehlmann would never have reported the
other attorney's misconduct if he had not learned of the exoneration proceeding
(he had, after all, already gone five years without reporting), and the result in this
case would have been that an innocent man would have been put to death by the
state.
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the "substantial question" language has been to establish a prior
balance between the bar's interest in prosecuting misconduct and
the attorney's interest in not being labeled a snitch. Such
balancing, I argue, is appropriate, but is not easily effected under
the current rule. Before turning our attention to that discussion,
however, we need to lay some groundwork for what follows by
attending to certain sociological attributes of the legal profession.
B. Values Served by Legal Professionalism
Professions have been defined by sociologists as "exclusive
occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to
particular cases."3  Most of the fundamental characteristics of
professionalism "have some relation to the establishment or
maintenance of market control. 35  One of the ways in which
professions maintain market control is through self-regulation.
36
Professionals themselves institute the standards that others must
meet in order to be admitted to the profession.37 They also adopt
the standards of behavior to which all members of the profession
will be held.38 In the case of lawyers, the state bar associations
adopt minimum proficiency requirements for admission to the bar
and rules of professional conduct. Since the ABA's adoption of
the Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969, these rules have
typically created substantive obligations with disciplinary
penalties.39
But not all of the interests of professional organizations are
related to economic forces; some are related to values such as
public service, professional fraternity, and maintaining the
profession's reputation with the public.40  These kinds of values
cannot be effectively provided for by creating substantive
obligations, since, under the threat of disciplinary sanctions,
actions in accordance with these values would lose their
34. Kritzer, supra note 4, at 717.
35. Croft, supra note 4, at 1266.
36. Id. at 1266-67.
37. Id.; Kritzer, supra note 4, at 717.
38. Croft, supra note 4, at 1266; Kritzer, supra note 4, at 717.
39. Gendry, supra note 5, at 604-05; Olsson, supra note 5, at 661.
40. Croft, supra note 4, at 1268-69; Kritzer, supra note 4, at 717.
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philanthropic character. Although the philanthropic values are not
protected by substantive rules, they are asserted in other ways,
most notably in the Preamble to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
The Preamble refers, on several occasions, to the importance of
a lawyer's personal moral compass in determining how to behave
ethically in any particular situation. Likewise, it indicates that the
opinions of other lawyers and the public are a valuable guide to
ethical behavior. For example:
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are
prescribed in the Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as
substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also
guided by personal conscience and the approbation of
professional peers.
In the nature of law practice . . . conflicting
responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult
ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an ethical person while
earning a satisfactory living. The Rules of Professional
Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts.
Within the framework of these Rules, however, many
difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such
issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moral judgment guided by the basic
principles underlying the Rules. These principles include
the lawyer's obligation zealously to protect and pursue a
client's legitimate interests, within the bounds of law, while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude
toward all persons involved in the legal system.
Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open
society, depends primarily upon understanding and
voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by
peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon
enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules
do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical
942 [Vol. 68
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considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no
worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by
legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the
ethical practice of law.4
1
All of this goes to say that the Rules themselves admit that they
are not the last word on every legal ethical question. With respect
to our discussion of Rule 8.3, it is helpful to observe that the moral
status of the informant is notoriously ambiguous.42 Informants are
absolutely necessary to the enforcement of professional rules, but
they are also frequently unpopular and accused of disloyalty.43
The Preamble to the Model Rules directs a lawyer to consider his
own ethical opinions, those of his professional peers, and those of
the public in evaluating his moral duties. Consulting these
attitudes, a lawyer is likely to find that the balance weighs against
reporting in all but the most egregious circumstances. In the moral
estimations of most, the values of loyalty and professional
fraternity are likely to win out over the bar's interest in discovering
violations of the Rules.44
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 7, 9, 16 (2007).
Admittedly, Louisiana has not adopted the ABA's Preamble. Smith, supra note
11, at 3. It would be unreasonable, however, to read the failure to enact the
Preamble as a repudiation of the values it espouses. In fact, the task force
recommending the adoption of the Model Rules in Louisiana indicated that,
although it would not recommend the adoption of the Preamble, it might still be
considered as "precatory," or persuasive authority. Id. at 11-13.
42. Lynch, supra note 3, at 491, 521-22.
43. Id at 521-22.
44. Id. But see E. Wayne Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to
Report Other Lawyer's Breaches of the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976
UTAH L. REv. 95, 100 ("If personal relationships and reluctance to cause trouble
for another lawyer are the hallmarks of the legal profession, then we should
immediately cease claiming that it is a profession and acknowledge that it is a
fraternity. Standards of camaraderie that may be appropriate for a fraternal
organization are not appropriate for a profession that plays an integral part in the
proper function of our system ofjustice.").
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C. The Operation of Rule 8.3 in Modern Legal Culture
Attorneys generally find it distasteful to report on one
another.45 A 1976 study showed that "of... 142 complaints filed
against members of the [Utah] bar in 1974, only eighteen were
filed by lawyers. 'A6 In 1975, 135 complaints were filed against
Utah lawyers, and only sixteen were filed by attorneys. 47 At that
time, the Utah Rule requiring reporting of professional misconduct
was modeled on Disciplinary Rule 1-103;4 thus, with the adoption
of the more lenient standard of Rule 8.3, it is reasonable to expect
that the percentage of complaints emanating from other attorneys
has been reduced even further. To be fair, however, the Utah study
made no distinction between substantiated complaints and those
without a basis in reality. It is probable that complaints filed by
laypersons are less likely to allege actual attorney misconduct,
since laypersons are typically unfamiliar with the standard of
conduct to which attorneys are held. If complaints filed by
attorneys were far more likely to be substantiated than those filed
by laypeople, it would severely damage the probative worth of the
Utah study.
A 1974 study posed this hypothetical to a group of one
thousand Boston lawyers:
Question 24: You learn that a colleague in your firm has
committed a flagrant violation of a canon, which, if
discovered, would result certainly in embarrassment for the
firm and quite possibly in criminal liability for your
colleague. You strongly approve of the canon which has
been violated. Assuming that no confidentiality exists
between you and your colleague, what would you do?
49
45. Gendry, supra note 5, at 606; Lynch, supra note 3, at 538; Olsson, supra
note 5, at 665.
46. Thode, supra note 44, at 99.
47. Id,
48. See id, at 97-99.
49. David 0. Burbank & Robert S. Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession:
A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 66, 99-100 (1974).
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There were no answer choices for this question; the attorneys'
responses were "open-ended." The experimenters then sorted the
responses into the following categories: 0
Do nothing 13.1
Deal with the individual 26.9
Deal with the individual and members of the firm 6.7
Deal with members of the firm 14.6
Deal with members of the firm and the bar association 2.2
Deal with the bar association 4.1
See that the individual is fired 12.6
Simply dissociate from the individual 2.6
Other response 0.7
Don't know 2.6
Blank 12.7
The study shows that a total of only 6.3% of the respondents would
report their colleague's serious misconduct to the bar association.
Only 40.2% of respondents would report serious misconduct to
anyone at all. And this is all true when the responding attorney
"strongly approves" of the Canon that has been violated.
Next, the experimenters posed this question:
Question 25: The same situation as in question 24, except
that the canon involved is one which you have previously
violated and which you strongly disapprove of. What
would you do?
51
Again, the attorneys' responses were open-ended. The results
were:
52
Do nothing 38.4
Deal with the individual 11.2
Deal with the individual and members of the firm 4.1
Deal with the members of the firm 8.2
Deal with the members of the firm and the association 0.4
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 101.
52. Id.
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Deal with the bar association 0.7
See that the individual is fired 1.8
Simply dissociate from the individual 0.0
Other response 2.6
Don't know 5.9
Blank 20.9
Couldn't happen 5.2
Under this hypothetical, only 1.1% of all respondents would report
the violation to the bar association. Only 15.2% would report the
violation to anyone.
The Boston study, like the Utah study, has some rather serious
flaws, at least for our purposes. First, it surveys only the extremes
of a continuum of attorney opinion. In the first question, the
attorney is asked to imagine that he strongly supports the Canon in
question; in the second, he is asked to imagine that he not only
strongly opposes the Canon, but has violated it himself. The
Boston study would be much more helpful if it posed an
intermediate hypothetical where the attorney is asked to imagine
that he is ambivalent about the Canon.
Secondly, the Boston study complicates matters by asking the
attorney to assume that he would be reporting on a co-worker. An
attorney is probably less likely to report a co-worker than to report
another attorney for professional misconduct. Rule 8.3 deals with
an attorney's duty to report any other lawyer's misconduct, and so
the Boston study would be more helpful if it did not skew the
results by making them dependent upon the co-worker relationship
between the attorneys. At the same time, however, it is likely that
lawyers are more likely to have knowledge of the misconduct of
their co-workers than of other lawyers, 53 and so the Boston study
may be more telling than it appears at first glance.
Lastly, self-reporting seems to be a particularly inadequate way
of determining what lawyers actually do when faced with an
ethical dilemma such as this one. Surely a different set of factors
weighs in the lawyer's mind when he contemplates reporting a
flesh and blood human being instead of a lifeless hypothetical. If
53. Gendry, supra note 5, at 606.
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the survey is skewed by a self-reporting bias, however, we can
likely predict at least in which direction the results are skewed. If
anything, the propensity to report professional misconduct was
likely over-reported in the Boston study.
Even the reported rates at which lawyers would report other
lawyers' misconduct, however, are startlingly low. Depending on
the attorney's opinion of the disciplinary rule that had been broken,
the likelihood of reporting the misconduct to the bar association
was somewhere between 1.1% and 6.3%. The likelihood of
reporting the misconduct to anyone at all varied between 15.2%
and 40.2%. 4 What accounts for attorneys' reluctance to report the
professional misconduct of others?
In the main, the answer is that attorneys fear the damage to
their professional reputation that may result from reporting.
55
Anonymity for reporting attorneys has been suggested as a solution
to this problem, but such a solution is difficult to implement. 56 In
many disciplinary proceedings, the testimony of the person filing
the complaint is important to the case against the transgressing
attorney.57 In order to protect the reporting attorney's anonymity,
he would need to be protected from testifying at the disciplinary
proceeding. In many cases, this would unravel the disciplinary
proceeding entirely, and the purpose of Rule 8.3 would be
undermined.
Where the duty to report arises with respect to a co-worker's
misconduct (as is frequently the case), there is a further
disincentive to reporting: the very real threat of retaliatory firing.
58
Some states have allowed a lawyer who is fired in retaliation for
54. Burbank & Duboff, supra note 49, at 101.
55. Gendry, supra note 5, at 611.
56. Id. at 611-12.
57. Id. at 612.
58. See generally id.; Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex.
1998); Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992); Lindsay M. Oldham &
Christine M. Whitledge, The Catch-22 of Model Rule 8.3, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 881, 881-89 (2002); Margaret Kline Kirkpatrick, Comment, Partners
Dumping Partners: Business Before Ethics in Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 83
MINN. L. REv. 1767 (1999); Christopher G. Senior, Comment, Does New York's
Code of Professional Responsibility Force Lawyers to Put Their Jobs on the Line?
A Critical Look at Wieder v. Skala, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 417 (1992).
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acting appropriately under Rule 8.3 a legal remedy;59 others have
found that the termination of an at-will employment contract for
any reason is proper.60 In the states where no ruling on the subject
has been handed down, the fear of a retaliatory firing may be
enough to suppress reporting of another attorney's misconduct.
And even where no retaliatory firing results, the reporting attorney
may be discriminated against in other subtler ways.
Furthermore, considerations like these seem to have become
even more important over the thirty years since the Utah and
Boston studies were conducted. One sociologist has noted,
speaking of the dawn of the twenty-first century, "[t]his has been
deemed the age of 'whatever,' implying that no one wants to make
a judgment, impose a standard, or call conduct unacceptable." 61
This sociological tendency would appear to make reporting of
lawyer misconduct even less likely now than it was thirty years
ago. This same span of years has also seen what some
commentators have called "the decline of professionalism"; this
refers to an across-the-board deterioration of traditional
professional values. 62 One of the causes of this decline, it has been
hypothesized, is that lawyers are now more highly concentrated in
large firms than they ever have been before.6 3 As attorneys work
together in greater and greater numbers, and in hierarchical
employment structures, their everyday experiences becomes more
similar to those of ordinary employees than of old-style
independent professionals.64 Lawyers who think of themselves as
employees are less likely to report the misconduct of their co-
workers than are lawyers who think of themselves as independent
professionals.
59. Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 110.
60. Bohatch, 997 S.W.2d 543.
61. Lynne M. Andersson & Christine M. Pearson, Titfor Tat? The Spiraling
Effect of Incivility in the Workplace, 24 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 452, 453 (1999).
62. Kritzer, supra note 4, at 715.
63. Id. at 722.
64. Id.
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D. Argument for a Balancing Approach
The propensity of lawyers to report the misconduct of their
peers has always been low, and there is reason to believe that it is
as low now as it has ever been. Attorneys refuse to report
misconduct, recognizing rightly that to do so would place their
reputations and their jobs in jeopardy. The bar has an interest in
regulating the conduct of its members, and Rule 8.3 helps to serve
that interest. However, the bar has a competing interest in
maintaining good relations between lawyers. Rule 8.3 does a
disservice to that interest. Where two legitimate interests compete,
a balancing test is appropriate to determine what duty exists in any
given case. Particularly when one of the interests is
acknowledged, but left unprotected by substantive law, balancing
should come into play.
The bar's interest in maintaining good relationships between
lawyers is aligned with an individual attorney's own self-interest in
preserving his reputation and job security. Thus, balancing the
bar's legitimate interest in enforcing the rules with its interest in
maintaining good relations between lawyers turns out to be the
same as balancing the bar's interest in enforcing the rules with the
attorney's interest in his reputation. But this is exactly the kind of
balancing that lawyers are already doing when deciding whether or
not to report the misconduct of their peers. I propose that the test
under Rule 8.3 take account of these factors and balance them in
individual cases.
65
It is a widely known criticism of balancing tests that, when66
applied by courts, they lead to unpredictable results. But in this
65. Of course, job security, reputation, and the bar's interest in enforcing the
disciplinary rules do not exhaust the factors to be considered under a balancing
approach. For an example of another factor, see In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239
(La. 2005). In that case, the attorney who had committed the underlying
misconduct died long before Riehlmann was investigated for failing to report.
Thus, the bar's interest in enforcing discipline for the underlying misconduct was
negated. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court appropriately found that
Riehlmann had failed in his duty to report, since the underlying misconduct had
prejudiced an innocent criminal defendant to the extent that he had been sentenced
to death.
66. Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REv. 585, 642
(1988).
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case, the unpredictability of a balancing approach would almost
certainly be preferable to unpredictability arising from the subjective
"substantial question" standard. In fact, since the "substantial
question" language of Rule 8.3 has failed in its stated objective of
making the duty to report more enforceable, the actual primary
effect of that language has been to institute a kind of prior balancing
of the interests involved. That is, the current Rule is an awkward
first attempt to "balance" the competing interests of the bar and the
individual attorney: when the conduct in question raises a
"substantial question," the bar's interest in holding disciplinary
proceedings per se outweighs the interest of the attorney in his
reputation; when the conduct does not raise a substantial question,
the attorney's interest in his reputation per se outweighs the bar's
interest in discipline.
Such an approach is clearly an oversimplification. It assumes
that all the damage caused to the individual attorney by a reporting
requirement is equal. This is simply false. Some lawyers, in
reporting the misconduct of others, put their jobs on the line; some
their professional reputations; and others only their comfort. To
treat such a range of burdens identically is the height of injustice.
Of course, an attorney contemplating his duty to report misconduct
under a balancing approach would also do well to recognize that the
bar's disciplinary committee may not be as impressed with the
prospective damage that reporting would cause as the attorney is
himself.
Finally, a true balancing approach has the salutary effect of more
meticulously holding the attorney who fails to report accountable for
his own moral failure. Under the "substantial question" test, the
attorney who violates Rule 8.3 is punished because the defmition of
"substantial" to which he adheres is different from the one offered
(almost certainly post hoc) by the state supreme court. This
linguistic variance is an appalling basis for punishment. The true
balancing approach holds the attorney accountable for putting his
own interests ahead of the bar's interests when the bar's interests
predominate. It is eminently more acceptable to hold the attorney
liable for this kind of poor balancing than for misapplying a standard
that has long been criticized as vague and subjective.
67. Gendry, supra note 5, at 609.
950 [Vol. 68
COMMENTS
In this respect, Louisiana is already one step ahead of the game,
since it has refused to adopt the ABA's "substantial question"
language. Regarding that refusal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
observed:
A task force of the Louisiana State Bar Association
concluded that it was inappropriate to put a lawyer "in the
position of making a subjective judgment" regarding the
significance of a violation, and felt it was preferable instead
"to put the burden on every lawyer to report all violations,
regardless of their nature or kind, whether or not they raised
a substantial question as to honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness.",
68
Though the task force ultimately reached a different conclusion
from the one I am offering, its reasoning is essentially compatible:
namely, the task force recognized that the Model Rule's "substantial
question" language creates an unmanageable standard that offers the
practitioner little guidance as to when reporting is required.69
Therefore the task force concluded that a different standard should
govern the practice of law in Louisiana.7 °
There is, however, no reason why these two versions of the
reporting requirement should be the only games in town. In a field
so dominated by conflicting moral opinions and legitimate but
incompatible social interests, discretion counsels that we suspend
judgment until we have considered the equities involved in
particular factual scenarios. Prior line-drawing, no matter where
such a line is drawn, is inherently arbitrary; it always has the
potential for unjust results. In many contexts these injustices are
tolerated, and rightly so, since careful balancing takes a heavy toll
on judicial economy. In the present context though, the price of
careful balancing is moderated by procedural peculiarities of
attorney disciplinary proceedings.
68. Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE TASK FORCE TO EVALUATE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 24 (1985)).
69. Id. See also Smith, supra note 11, at 30-31.
70. Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d at 1246; Smith, supra note 11, at 30-31.
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In Louisiana, attorney disciplinary proceedings are tried through
the hearing committees of the Attorney Disciplinary Board.71 The
hearing committees make disciplinary recommendations, 72 which
are then subject to review by the Attorney Disciplinary Board
itself 73 and the state supreme court.7 4 Thus, Louisiana district courts
and circuit courts never hear attorney disciplinary matters. As such,
the only dockets that could possibly be slowed by a balancing test
are those of the Attorney Disciplinary Board and the state supreme
court. The vast weight of the state's legal machinery would remain
completely unaffected. Furthermore, prosecutions under Rule 8.3
are sufficiently rare75 such that a more nuanced test is unlikely to
have an appreciable effect on any tribunal's docket.
E. Redrafting Rule 8.3
I propose the following rule as a replacement for Model Rule 8.3:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(d) It shall be an affirmative defense to disciplinary action
under this rule that reporting would have created an undue
burden on the lawyer with knowledge of the underlying
violation. Sources of such an undue burden shall include but
shall not be limited to damage to the lawyer's reputation,
working relationships, or employment stability.
76
71. LA.SUP.CT.R. 19 §3(D).
72. Id.
73. Id § 1 1(F).
74. Id. § l l(G).
75. A Westlaw search reveals that from 1999 to 2005, there was an average of
only two reported Louisiana Supreme Court decisions per year that even cited
Rule 8.3.
76. Part (b) of the Model Rule creates an obligation to report judicial
misconduct in language identical to that of part (a). For reasons similar to those
cited in this paper, that language should be redrafted in the same way that I have
suggested redrafting part (a) of the Rule. Part (c) of the Model Rule exempts
privileged and confidential information from the reporting requirement. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2007). I omit those sections from my
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Part (a) is based on the current language of Rule 8.3(a)," but the
qualifying language of that part has been omitted. Like Disciplinary
Rule 1-103, it adopts a clear policy in favor of reporting professional
misconduct. The arbitrary and subjective "substantial question"
standard is absent. Instead, the new language qualifying the duty to
report has been moved to its own section, part (d) of the redrafted
rule. The qualifying language now takes the form of an affirmative
defense. This is because it seems appropriate to shift the burden to
the attorney to prove that his duty to report was outweighed by other
legitimate interests.
Finally, I recognize that it might well be argued that the "undue
burden" language creates a standard every bit as subjective as the
Model Rule's reference to a "substantial question." This is probably
true. But any standard we might adopt in this area that even
attempts to recognize the competing interests involved will
necessarily be steeped in subjectivity. If the choice then is between
the subjectivity of an awkward per se balancing test, and the
subjectivity of a fact-intensive true balancing test, then, to the mind
of this author, the choice is clear.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Again, suppose a man's father were stealing from temples
or digging an underground passage to the Treasury-ought
his son to report him to the authorities?"
"No, that would be a sin. Indeed, if the father were charged,
his son ought to defend him."
"So patriotism does not, then, come before all other
obligations?"
"Yes, it does indeed, but our coun,try will benefit by having
sons who are loyal to their parents.
redrafted version of Rule 8.3 because they have not been discussed in analysis
here.
77. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007).
78. CICERO, On Duties III, in SELECTED WORKS 157, 194-95 (Michael Grant
trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1971).
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Conflicts of societal duties and personal loyalties are as ancient
as civilization itself.79 It is thus the epitome of normalcy that we
have found ourselves at a loss for how to adequately resolve them in
the abstract. What is clear, however, is that such conflicts would not
elicit the sense of urgency that they do if our societal duties and our
personal loyalties did not both serve compelling interests. 80  We
should be cautious, then, in purporting to draw bright lines as to
when one or the other of these interests prevails. Only a thorough
factual analysis can hope to reveal, in a given case, which interest
predominates.
The bar sets the standards of legal professionalism. But the bar
does not speak with a single voice on the issue of reporting
misconduct, because the bar is not merely a rule-giver, but also a
collection of lawyers. The Preamble to the Model Rules instructs
that "a lawyer is . . . guided by personal conscience and the
approbation of professional peers." Frequently, a lawyer's
"professional peers" share his distaste for "tattling."
I do not call for a professionalism of tight-lipped secrecy, where
professional fraternity excuses every failure to report misconduct.
Instead, I call for a substantive acknowledgement of the values that
the Rules of Professional Conduct purport to promote. If the
opinions of fellow lawyers are an appropriate consideration for an
attorney who wishes to behave professionally, then it is likewise
appropriate for the law to take account of those opinions in
mitigation of an attorney's failure to report misconduct.
Ryan Williams*
79. Indeed, Cicero cites an even more ancient thinker, Hecato, as the source
of the quoted dialog. Id.
80. See Lynch, supra note 3, at 521-22.
81. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 7 (2007).
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